

Command Report
Headquarters, 2d Infantry Division
Period: 1-28 February 1951

(CSHIS-5 (R1))

Appendix G

1. After Action Report of the 23d Regimental Combat Team from 29 January 1951 to 16 February 1951.

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Appendix: G-1

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After Action Report of the 23d Regimental Combat Team
from 29 January 1951 to 16 February 1951.

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HEADQUARTERS 23D RCT
APO 243, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

13 March 1951

SUBJECT: After Action Report Covering Operations
of the 23d Regimental Combat Team During
the Period 290630 Jan to 152400 Feb 51

TO: Commanding General
2d Infantry Division
APO 243, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

On 29 January 1951, at 0700, a motorized patrol consisting of one (1) Officer and 29 Enlisted men had the mission of making a reconnaissance of the "Twin Tunnels" area (CS3344). This patrol was joined by the 21st Regiment, 24th Division, patrol of 1 Officer and 14 Enlisted men at YOUNG. The two patrols started out together on 23d Infantry vehicles, since the 21st Infantry patrol could not get vehicles across the river. When the patrols reached the "Twin Tunnels" area, they were fired upon by an undetermined number of enemy on HILL 333 (CS33449). Also shortly after, the air OP reported that from 10 - 20 enemy were firing at the patrol from HILL 453, (CS330424); that there were about 60 enemy on HILL 453; that there were about 20 enemy moving North along the road towards the patrol. At 1230 hours using small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire, the enemy had forced the patrol to displace and dig-in on the nearby high ground at (CS336443).

At 1500 hours the patrol requested an air drop of ammunition and shortly thereafter, the air OP reported that the enemy was closing in on the patrol from the East, South and West. At 1615 hours the Air OP reported that another enemy group of undetermined strength, with one (1) machine gun, was firing on the patrol from a location at CS3244. The T-OP called air strikes on the enemy at CS3343 and CS33443 with excellent results. At 1630 hours the Air OP reported a group estimated at from 15 - 20 enemy on ridge lines at CS3540. This last report showed that the patrol was completely surrounded, consequently the Regimental Commander dispatched "F" Company to rescue it. By 1715 hours the patrol, which was dug-in with one (1) machine gun, received the ammunition air drop. At 1730 hours, the air OP reported that the relief company was in the vicinity of CS3341, approximately 2000 yards from the besieged patrol.

At 2335 hours "F" Company reached the patrol, after having had a fire fight with an estimated two (2) enemy battalions on HILL 453 at 1735 hours. By 0330 hours after continuous combat, the surrounded patrol was extricated with the enemy still making attacks on their vacated positions. 30 friendly WIA and 11 others were evacuated to the 24th Division. Five (5) MIA were left behind. The enemy casualties from the ground action were 200 MIA and 175 WIA.

The result of this contact with the enemy main force, was that the 23d RCT was given the mission of seeking out and destroying the enemy in the "Twin Tunnels" area, CS3344. Therefore on 30 Jan, the 3d Battalion and the French Battalion, which was attached to the RCT, moved up to an assembly area 4 miles South of the Tunnels Area.

At 0630 hours, on 31 January, the 23d Regimental Combat Team (-) consisting of the 3d Battalion; the French Battalion; the 37th FA Battalion minus one (1) Battery which stayed with the 2d Battalion; and 2nd Battery, 2d AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion moved from the assembly

area to the Line of Departure. At 1000 hours the attacking battalions crossed the advance LD with the French Battalion on the left and the 3d Battalion on the right. The attacking forces secured the successive intermediate objectives without ground contact with the enemy. At 1630 hours the 23d RCT (-) established a tight perimeter defense for the night. At the same time that the attacking battalions were advancing North, "B" Company moved North from the 2d Bn positions and then West so as to screen the right flank. After contacting the 3d Bn at 1930 hours, "B" Company returned by truck to the 2d Bn positions at IHO-RI. "B" Company moved up from the 1st Bn positions at IHO-RI to provide security for the 37th FA Battalion (-).

At 0450 hours on the morning of 1 Feb 51, an estimated two (2) enemy regiments attacked the perimeter of the 23d RCT located at CS2344. The enemy dressed in GI uniforms initially assaulted "H" Company's positions. Later, during the first hours of daylight, the blowing of bugles, whistles and horns and strong infantry assaults characterized the enemy attacks.

At 0900 hours the enemy started to attack the perimeter on the South-west sector held by the French Bn. At 0930 hours the French Battalion was engaged in hand to hand fighting with the enemy on HHI 453, CS240425. By 1023 hours the enemy had forced "H" Company to give up some ground, but the fighting had slackened somewhat on the West. However, in the French sector the hand to hand fighting continued to rage. At 1200 hours "L" Company had retaken its lost ground, but was still under strong enemy pressure. Casualties on both sides were heavy because of the close-in fighting of the opposing forces.

Upon learning of the steadily increasing tempo of the attacks, the Commanding General of the 2d Division ordered that the perimeter be reinforced. Consequently, the 1st Bn 23d RCT at IHO-RI began to move towards the perimeter at 0630 hours. The 2d Bn at LUMANG-RI began to move at 1430 hours to IHO-RI to replace the 1st Bn, while the 3d Bn, 9th Inf Regt began its move to replace the 2d Bn, 23d RCT. Also the 23d Tank Co started towards the perimeter to provide its much needed assistance.

The enemy sent company-size probing attacks, which reached "B" Company, 2d Bn, which was providing security for the 37th FA Bn, while the 37th FA Bn kept firing steadily in support of the 23d RCT (-). "B" Company fought and successfully repulsed the enemy. The 37th FA Bn had been taking under fire large enemy groups which were endeavoring to come around both flanks.

With the mission of holding the high ground around the "Twin Tunnels" area, the 23d RCT requested and received two (2) air drops of ammunition, rations, water, gasoline, and radio batteries. Also, during the day, more than eighty (80) planes supported the 23d RCT. Enemy pressure had materially subsided by 1800 hours and at 2045 hours the now three (3) Battalions (plus) Combat Team was no longer engaged with the enemy.

During the day's fighting, the enemy, using his standard encircling tactics, had set up two (2) fire blocks on the road to the South. The 2d Reconnaissance Company, operating from the vicinity of IHO-RI, engaged these road blocks. At 1230 hours, with the 23d RCT still intact, the 1st Battalion began to arrive at the perimeter having, in conjunction with the 2d Recon Company, cleared the road from the South. At 1900 hours, one (1) Company of the 2d Bn arrived with the remainder of the battalion on the way, expecting to arrive by 0200 hours the following morning. Also the remaining Battery of the 37th FA Bn, which had been with the 2d Battalion, joined the other Batteries of the 37th FA Bn to increase their fires.

The following day, 2 Feb, all units readjusted and consolidated their positions and conducted vigorous patrols to maintain contact with the enemy. Tanks placed fire on a village at CS15463. This action flushed many enemy personnel out of the buildings and then the artillery

took them under fire with excellent results. The artillery also placed a concentration upon HILL 319, CS321459 with excellent results. Friendly harassing artillery fire was placed around the perimeter throughout the day and night. An undetermined number of enemy located near the village of SINDAE, CS313465, fired upon a patrol which had been sent to the vicinity of CHIPYONG-NI. This patrol observed small enemy groups and reported them back to the Artillery, which placed them under fire.

Air, artillery and ground action inflicted an estimated 3600 enemy casualties during the enemy attack of 1 Feb. Immediately to the front of the perimeter, an actual count of the enemy dead revealed 600 in front of the 3d Bn, 300 on HILL 453, and 400 around the remainder of the perimeter for a total of 1300 enemy dead.

After the "Twin Tunnels" operation, the 23d Regimental Combat Team continued the attack to the key communications center of CHIPYONG-NI on 3 February 1951. The 23d secured the town in the late afternoon with only sporadic enemy resistance from the vicinity of HILL 506. By 2000 hours, the RCT had occupied defensive positions on the high ground surrounding the town. During the period 3-12 February, the RCT continued its consolidation of positions on the perimeter with the mission of holding CHIPYONG-NI to: (1) Deny the enemy the use of the road net; (2) To hold the left flank of line 2-2 until the 3d FOC Division in V Corps reserve could deploy along this line and attack to the North. The 23d RCT conducted vigorous patrolling in all directions for a distance of Three (3) miles. Company size patrols were dispatched daily, which engaged various size enemy groups to the North and Northwest.

Six (6) hills, which were desirable to occupy: 345 to the Northwest; 503 to the Northeast; 159 and 319 to the Southeast; 397 to the South and 245 to the East, dominated the area around CHIPYONG-NI. A perimeter formed on these hills would have required more troops than were available to the Regimental Commander. Therefore a smaller perimeter had to be established on lower, less desirable ground. To accomplish his mission and still maintain a reserve, the Regimental Commander placed the rifle companies of the 23d RCT around the perimeter in a clock-like fashion. Company "C" at 12:00 o'clock, "A" at 1:00, "J" at 2:00, "I" at 3:00, "H" at 4:00, "E" at 5:00, "F" at 6:00, "G" at 7:00, 1st French Company at 8:00, 3d French Company at 9:00, French ROT Company at 10:00, and 2d French Company at 11:00. The Regimental Commander retained "B" Company and the 1st Ranger Company as Regimental Reserve, within the perimeter, behind "A" and "C" Companies. With the units in these positions (for further details, see sketch), the night of 12 - 13 February passed with no enemy contact. However, units on all sides of the perimeter reported intense flare activity.

Normal patrols for the daylight hours of 13 Feb reported increased enemy activity close to the perimeter in three directions, North, East, and West. Air OP reported enemy groups to the North and East moving toward the perimeter and TACP directed forty (40) flights of aircraft against the enemy, when it was not possible to place artillery upon them. The 2d Recon Company, reinforced by "L" Company, 9th Regiment, reported enemy moving from Southeast of CHIPYONG-NI Westward toward the 13R. They engaged the enemy in a fire fight and were forced to withdraw to a position South of the perimeter, where the 2d Recon Company reverted to Division Control. Observers on all sides of the perimeter again reported flare activity during the late afternoon and early evening. Between 2200 - 2300 hours enemy small arms and mortar fire began to fall on the perimeter from the Northwest, North, and Southeast. Shortly thereafter, enemy troops attacked the 1st Battalion which was occupying the Northern sector of the perimeter. Heavy mortar and artillery fire preceded this attack. As midnight approached, activity spread in other directions until the 3d Bn on the Southeast of the perimeter was the only unit not in contact with the enemy. Mortar and artillery also fell on the Regimental Command Post, Field Artillery and Heavy Mortar Company areas. As at the "Twin Tunnels" area the enemy frequently blew on whistles, horns and bugles.

As the activity subsided somewhat after midnight, a quick check revealed that a portion of the 1st Bn CP was burning and a M-16 half-track on the Southeast part of the perimeter had been damaged.

At 0100 hours of 14 February, the enemy launched another strong attack from the North and then from the Northwest. The defending troops of the perimeter repulsed these attacks but the enemy could be heard digging in. Observers noted much activity to the North where they also detected enemy mortar positions. At about 0215 hours the enemy launched new attacks from the Southwest and Southeast, with the enemy from the Southeast making a desperate frontal assault against the positions of "K" Company. At 0245 hours friendly troops were still holding in both areas, therefore the enemy launched another heavy attack from the Northwest against the positions held by the French Bn. Fifteen (15) minutes later, the enemy hit "C" Company again but the defending troops held. By 0530 hours most of the pressure was off the troops in the perimeter, except for the French who were still receiving attacks from the Northwest which they repulsed; "I" Company had regained its positions but "K" Company was fighting fiercely to hold their sector. The stubborn enemy launched another attack from the North against "C" Company's positions at 0545 hours but was repulsed. In the South, the enemy had made unsuccessful attempts to infiltrate the lines.

At 0630 hours the fighting flared up again, the 2d Recon Company and "L" Company, 9th Inf, reported that they were being attacked on three sides. The enemy attacked the perimeter from the Southeast again, but was driven off by "F" and "I" Companies. Elsewhere on the perimeter the enemy was feinting at the lines and withdrawing. At 0730 hours "K" Company on the Southeast was still fighting and the French Battalion on the Northwest was hit again, but shortly after, the enemy broke physical contact on the entire perimeter. Observers reported occasional enemy activity during the rest of the morning and intermittently, mortar rounds fell inside the lines. During the afternoon of 14 February the T-CP brought in three (3) air strikes to the South and the 23d BCT received twenty-four (24) air drops of ammunition. Also the enemy increased his activity to the South.

The first enemy action of the evening occurred at 2030 hours when "K" Company received a mortar barrage. At 2130 hours "C" Company reported sounds of the enemy digging in to their front. The Regimental CO ordered conservation of all types of small arms ammunition as the supply was critically short in spite of the air drops. There were no reserves of 8-round clips for the M-1 rifles other than those in the company stocks at this time.

Simultaneously with an attack from the South on the 2d Battalion area, the enemy brought the BCT CP under heavy Self-propelled Gun, mortar and small arms fire. This continued for approximately an hour and the impact area spread out to include Mortar Company and the French Battalion trains area. Fighting increased around the perimeter until the 2d and 3d Battalions to the South and Southeast were engaged in fierce close combat. Bugles sounded on the hills to the North and 120mm heavy mortar rounds began to fall in the regimental CP area. The fighting abated for a short period but the action swelled again when "K" and "A" Companies were attacked at 0130 hours, the 15th of February, "C" Company repulsed two (2) enemy attacks, while pressure increased on the South and Southwest against "I" Company.

At 0230 hours, the enemy penetrated "I" Company but were driven out with the aid of "L" Company, after vicious, close-in fighting. The overwhelming number of enemy forced the "G" Company line to withdraw at 0315 hours with heavy losses to "G" Company. The Regimental CO ordered counter-attacks to retake the lost ground. A composite force of Rangers, one platoon of "F" Company and the remaining troops of "G" Company was assembled to accomplish this mission. While they were forming, "L" and "C" Companies repulsed another severe attack from the North. Ammunition

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stocks in the companies had become so low that commanders ordered their men not to fire unless they could actually see and hit the enemy. At this time, the supply trains contained less than 140 rounds of 4.2 mortar and 90 rounds of 81mm mortar ammunition. The commitment of the Ranger Company left only "B" Company in Regimental Reserve. The counter attack to retake "C" Company positions commenced at 0615 hours. At 0800 hours the enemy repulsed the counter attacking composite force with heavy losses to the friendly troops. The Regimental CO ordered "B" Company to the "C" Company area to retake the vital lost ground, and thus secure the integrity of the perimeter. Heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from the reverse slopes of "B" Company's objective prevented them from taking and holding the position. Supporting tanks were unable to gain positions for assault fire because the roads were heavily mined. At 1400 hours "B" Company was still unable to move so the TACOP brought in air strikes and napalm drops which routed the enemy and enabled "B" Company to proceed to their objective.

Meanwhile the RCT CO notified "B" Company of the 2d Engineers that they were now the Regimental Reserve. With the coming of full daylight the activity on the remainder of the perimeter ceased and air drops began to resupply the almost completely exhausted stocks of ammunition. An enemy mortar fired into the "drop" zone and the Regimental CP Area throughout the morning, inflicting heavy casualties on the crews that were recovering the supplies. Counter-battery by mortar and artillery silenced this enemy mortar at 1130 hours.

Also a radio contact had been established with the 5th Cavalry Regiment which was approaching CHIPYONG-NI from the Southwest. Later, at 1230 hours, the air OP reported that the leading elements of the 5th were now about 9000 yards Southwest of the perimeter, moving slowly. By 1630 hours "B" Company, now secure in defensive positions, could see the leading elements of the 5th Cavalry task force approaching from the Southwest. The men within the perimeter could see the enemy fleeing to the hills as the column drew nearer and were taken under artillery fire. At 1700 hours the Regimental Commander ordered all units to hold their fire as ammunition stocks of every type were almost depleted. Reports of large enemy groups to the North and Northwest continued to come in. The 23d RCT reported to the 2d Division that a total of 131 sorties had been flown in support for the day of 15 Feb. A night drop by 10 aircraft was necessary to resupply the RCT with small arms and mortar ammunition. The last air drop was at 2340 hours.

The 5th Cavalry task force entered the perimeter at 1715 hours. At 2000 hours "B" Company withdrew to positions closer to the town of CHIPYONG-NI and closed the perimeter for the night. Other than flare activity the enemy did not indicate any desire to attack, in spite of reports that indicated that he was digging in to the North, East and Southwest. No enemy contacts were made during the remaining two days that the 23d RCT remained at CHIPYONG-NI.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

JOHN B. DULANE
Major, Infantry
Regimental S - 3

ANNEX I

THE ROLE OF BATTERY "B"
82d AAA AV (SP) BN
IN THE
PERIMETER DEFENSE OF CHIPYONG-NI
13 - 15 FEB 1951

At 2200 hours, 13 Feb, the sound of small arms fire at the Regimental perimeter and later, mortar rounds in the vicinity of Battery "B's" area, indicated that the perimeter was under an attack. The Battery Commander contacted all of his vehicles, both M-16s and M-19s, and placed them on the alert. Captain Wilson established liaison with the Regimental S-3 and had direct wire communication to the battery CP.

The Battery Commander had six M-16s and four M-19s in operation during the battles of CHIPYONG-NI. At about 2250 hours, an M-16 which was in support of Battery "B", 503d FA Bn, was under heavy small arms and mortar fire. This vehicle, which was emplaced on the regimental perimeter with the French on the right and "G" Company on the left, was not engaging the enemy as yet. About 45 minutes later the three vehicles covering the south approach to the perimeter, two M-16s and an M-19 of the 2nd Platoon, engaged and helped to repulse the enemy advancing through the Railroad Tunnel from HILL 397 and crossing over the RR trestles. From 2245-0300 hours these vehicles engaged the enemy attempting to cross under the RR trestles and across the river in the 2d and 3d Bn area on the southeast side of the Perimeter. At 2300 hours one of the M-19s was under mortar fire and three crew members were wounded. An M-16 while under small arms and machine gun fire, engaged and repulsed the enemy on HILL 248 who were trying to overrun Hqs and "C" Battery 37th FA Battalion from the West. From 2400 - 0300 hours the vehicles in the "K" Company area engaged concentrations of enemy troops attacking the 3d Battalion sector of the perimeter from the south on the MSR.

At 0045 hours, 14 Feb, an M-16 was dispatched with ammunition resupply and replacements for wounded men in "K" Company sector. The turret became inoperative and was replaced by an M-19 with the same mission. At 0100 hours the vehicle contacted the litter jeep at the 3d Battalion CP and lead it to the vicinity of "K" Company sector. The infantry support was pinned down by the enemy fire and forced to stay behind. The M-19 and the jeep were attacked by enemy from the vicinity of the RR trestle, the litter jeep was destroyed and two aid men and one crew member were wounded. The M-19 penetrated the fire block. It then attempted to return through the fire block on the RR trestle with the wounded under the cover of an M-4 tank, which was approaching from within the perimeter. However the tank was hit with a shaped charge which wounded the driver, so the evacuation had to be postponed and the M-19 was emplaced with the other vehicles on the perimeter.

Sgt Shelbrack, from his M-19, adjusted counter-mortar fire on the enemy position on HILL 397, by means of the following method of communication from his vehicle, SCR 508 to the Battery CP; from the CP, relayed by wire to the liaison officer with the Regimental S-3; who had voice contact with the mortar company CO who had wire contact to his FDC. Through this relay system the enemy mortar fire was neutralized.

From 0230 to 0300 hours, the vehicles in the 3d Battalion area were in continuous engagement with the enemy from the southeast. From 0245 to 1150 hours an M-16 engaged enemy infantry attacking Battery "B", 503d FA Battalion, across the area between HILL 248 and the French positions. The enemy was close in before they were engaged. The main attack was repulsed by 0500 hours, but probing attacks continued.

The M-16 which had been damaged at the road block was repaired by

0300 hours and placed in Battery reserve. At 0400 hours it was sent to the vicinity of the fire block in the 2d and 3d Battalion sector and engaged the enemy, fighting under heavy fire until 0800 hours. From 0500 to 0700 hours the M-16 near "C" Battery, 37th FA Battalion, sporadically fired on the enemy as they continued their attacks. At 0700 hours an M-19 and an M-16 delivered saturation fire on HILL 345. At 0800 hours an M-19 displaced to the vicinity of "K" Company, found the fire block neutralized by the M-16. One section displaced to the vicinity of HILL 229 to fire on HILL 506.

At 0900 hours three vehicles arrived in the Battery area from the southeast perimeter with wounded and three Chinese prisoners. Prisoners were released to the Regimental aid station. At 0930 hours they returned to the southeast perimeter and at 1000 hours, in support of "K" Company, engaged an estimated 50 enemy infantry approaching the perimeter from a draw running South on the East side of the MSR between HILL 319 and the MSR. The attack was repulsed. From 1000 to 1800 hours, one M-19 near the Battery CP in general support fired on HILLS 345, 248, and 319.

At 1145 hours an M-16 reported that it was under sniper fire on the road in the vicinity of "B" Battery, 503d FA Battalion. At 1300 hours three vehicles engaged an estimated enemy company approaching "K" Company from the South along the MSR, helping to drive off the enemy. At 1330 hours an M-19 was displaced to a position in support of the 1st Battalion in the vicinity of "B" Company. At 1600 hours the M-16 near "C" Battery, 37th FA Battalion engaged approximately 40 retreating enemy near HILL 248 and killed 11 of them. At 1700 hours an M-19 engaged and destroyed an enemy machine gun position above the RR tunnel in "K" Company sector. Meanwhile at 1600 hours three vehicles fired on enemy fleeing before an attacking "K" Company squad, killing an estimated 60. When "K" Company squad returned to their positions, about one half of each gun crew dismounted and conducted a mop-up of the former enemy positions. The CO of "K" Company was contacted and sent infantry to this operation which had been carried on under heavy mortar, small arms, and machinegun fire. Ten enemy and much enemy equipment were captured.

At 1745 hours, an M-16 was covering with fire, the south ridge of HILL 248 from an outpost of "B" Battery, 503d FA Battalion. At 1800 hours an M-19 and an M-16 from the 3d Battalion area displaced to cover the critical RR tunnel area and the trestle between the 2d and 3d Battalion sectors. They came under small arms fire from a small enemy force as it passed the vicinity of the RR tunnel south of the road. This enemy action was broken by fire from the moving M-16. Then, operating as a section, these two vehicles engaged enemy positions near the MSR throughout the night; 3 enemy machine gun positions were known to be destroyed and 75 enemy obviously killed by AA fire, were found the next morning. At 1930 hours these vehicles received fire from an enemy high velocity weapon located in a draw between HILLS 506 and 319. The enemy weapon withdrew after return fire from the 40-mm guns.

From 2115 to 0030 hours, the M-16 near "B" Battery, 503d FA Battalion was under mortar and small arms fire from the vicinity of "G" Company. At 2200 hours the M-19 in the vicinity of "G" Company was hit by enemy mortar and self-propelled gun fire. The turret was knocked out and one crew member was wounded. The M-19 near "K" Company returned the fire of a high velocity weapon emplaced on HILL 506 and silenced it. Also the M-19 at the Battery CP fired on HILL 248 at the request of the French with very good results and repeated fire at 2400 hours after coming under machinegun fire from HILL 319 and neutralizing 2 enemy machineguns.

At 0030 hours, 15 Feb, an M-16 displaced with the other weapons in the sector on orders of an artillery officer, into "B" Company, 503d FA Battalion area to provide support for friendly infantry attacking to recapture the high ground southeast of this part of the perimeter, ("G" Company area). The vehicle came under heavy mortar, small arms, machine gun, and grenade fire and was run off the narrow shoulder of the road.

The crew was forced to abandon the vehicle and enter near-by cover except for one man who remained behind to destroy the vehicle in the event the enemy over-ran it. At 0100 hours, the M-16 near "C" Battery, 37th FA Battalion engaged and silenced an enemy machine gun position. The M-19 at the battery area, which came under enemy SP and mortar fire, displaced to the vicinity of the RR trestle and fired until dawn. At 0300 hours, the M-16 near "C" Battery, 37th FA Battalion engaged an SP gun position on HILL 397. At 0600 hours it engaged and knocked out a machine gun on that hill.

From 0600 to 0700 hours the abandoned M-16, still under fire, was retrieved by an M-4 tank and placed into action against the enemy attacking positions in the former "C" Company positions. "B" Company, 503d FA Battalion area was evacuated except for the wounded. This vehicle supported a friendly counter-attack, which proved to be unsuccessful. From 0700 to 0830 hours, it engaged enemy attempting to attack "B" Battery, 503d FA Battalion. The attack was repelled and the vehicle supported the evacuation of the wounded from the area. It engaged the enemy in the former "G" Company positions until the gun barrels burned out, then it withdrew to its battery area. At 0700 hours an M-16 engaged and killed two of the enemy in front of 3d Battery sector. 0715 to 1600 hours, vehicles in the Battery CP area were under sporadic enemy mortar fire. Two officers, three enlisted men were wounded, however the vehicle continued to engage enemy positions on HILL 397.

At 0800 hours an M-16 dispersed enemy troops on the left side of HILL 319. From 1015 to 1130 hours, an M-16 engaged the enemy attempting to withdraw over HILL 397 to the southeast. At 1330 hours an M-16 fired saturation fire on part of HILL 248. At 1500 the vehicles in the "K" Company area dispersed a large enemy force on HILL 319, fired on enemy troops moving down the south side of HILL 397, and silenced an enemy SP gun position. At 1530 hours, they engaged sniper and mortar positions on HILL 319 and knocked them out. At 1600 hours, the vehicles at the Battery CP moved out with tanks and supported the counter-attack on the former "G" Company positions with known results of one enemy machine gun destroyed and 15 enemy killed. Also the M-16 near "C" Battery, 37th FA Battalion engaged 49 to 50 enemy troops retreating on HILL 120, killing an estimated 20 of them. From 1700 to 1830, the M-16 at the RR trestle area fired saturation fire on HILL 397. At 2100 hours all was quiet around the perimeter. During this 4 day period "B" Battery, 82d AAA AW Bn (SP) fired 4500 rounds of 40-mm ammunition and 62,500 rounds of .50 cal machine gun ammunition. Fifteen men were wounded; eight evacuated. One M-19 was lost, probably temporarily.

Again the M-19 had proven itself ideal for firing at observed point targets. A full-track mount for the M-16 is indicated and more crew-protecting armor would have prevented every casualty among the gun crews.

Although liaison with the Regimental S-3 was maintained by wire, radio, and liaison officer, the AAA Commander was not always aware of the sector where the enemy presented the greatest threat. Vehicles can be dispatched to vital areas only when infantry commanders, through the operations section, request fire. During this action, AAA fire was requested only for planned operations. Other spot displacements were made by the AAA Commander on the basis of reports from his vehicles and of reconnaissance. Neither of these factors will always give the complete picture.

ANNEX III

ROLE OF THE ARTILLERY
AT

CHIPYONG-NI

13 - 15 FEB 1951

The 37th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm Howitzer) with Battery B, 503d Field Artillery (155mm Howitzer) attached as a part of the 23d Regimental Combat Team had closed into the CHIPYONG-NI perimeter, CHIPYONG-NI, Korea, coordinates CS 79.2-47.7, Sheet 6726 III, 1/50,000 Map of Korea, at approximately 1200 hours 5 February 1951. The 23d Regimental Combat Team had fought its way into CHIPYONG-NI from the WONJU-YOJU road since 2 February 1951 and by 1600 hours, 5 February 1951 the entire Regimental Combat Team was established inside the perimeter as shown on attached sketch.

During the period 5 February 1951 through 12 February 1951 the mission of the 23d Regimental Combat Team was to hold the town of CHIPYONG-NI, securing the IX Corps right flank, and to continue patrol action, destroying the enemy when and where found. There was strong and fanatic resistance by the Chinese Communist Forces and a continual build-up all around the Chipyong-Ni perimeter daily. Ground and air observers were reporting stronger build-up every day during the period and a general movement of Chinese Communist Forces to the East and South. Their troop movements were continuously fired on by the 37th FA Battalion and Battery "B", 503d FA Battalion. By 2400 hours, 12 February 1951, all batteries were split into platoons and were layed on all sectors surrounding the perimeter. Communications with all forward observers and Liaison Officers were excellent as all units were very close and the problem of maintenance and service was relatively simple. Supplies were being air dropped by the evening of 12 February 1951 but no 105mm ammunition was dropped on that date. Air activity was greatly increased on 12 February 1951, which helped conserve artillery ammunition, as it was quite evident that all ammunition available in both 105 and 155mm was going to be very much needed, and the amount of resupply very indefinite.

On the morning of 13 February 1951 it had been determined that there were three Chinese Communist Force Divisions in the area immediately surrounding the perimeter and another approximately 7 miles Southeast who had succeeded in cutting the East road and establishing a road block. The West road was also reported cut on the morning of 13 Feb 1951 and it was quite evident that an all out effort would be made at any time to annihilate the defenders of the CHIPYONG-NI perimeter. Word had previously been received that elements of the 2d Division on the right had been ordered to fall back, and further to the right, other elements of the 2d Division and the 8th ROK Division were under heavy pressure. During the daylight hours of 13 Feb 1951, the air pounded the enemy and the 37th FA Battalion plus Battery "B", 503d FA Battalion continued to support the efforts of the infantry and fire on targets of opportunity from air and ground observation posts. The strength of the enemy still increased and their actions were limited to probing attacks only. During the day, the 37th FA Battalion fired a total of 33 missions, expending 797 rounds and inflicting approximately 530 casualties on the enemy. Battery "B" of the 503d FA Battalion expended approximately 300 rounds and inflicted an estimated 500 casualties on the enemy.

At 2215 hours the Chinese Communist Forces launched a strong attack against the perimeter preceded by mortar and artillery fire. The artillery and mortar fire was very accurate and fell in "Inspire" and "Impede" Command Posts and in battery positions. Among the casualties was the Regimental Combat Team Commander. The main effort was made on the South and East of the perimeter in the area defended by the 2nd Battalion, 23d Infantry and the French Battalion (See Sketch).

The attack failed to penetrate the perimeter but continued until 0700 hours, during which time the 37th FA Battalion plus Battery "D" of the 503d FA Battalion fired continuously in close support of the perimeter defenders. All men that were not actively engaged in firing were on the perimeter engaging the enemy with small arms and automatic weapons. In the French sector the French Battalion counter attacked and routed the Chinese from their immediate front. By dawn of 14 February 1951, the Chinese Communist Forces had withdrawn to the hills surrounding CHIPYONG-NI.

During the daylight hours of 14 Feb 1951, the Chinese Communist Forces were reorganizing and the 37th FA Battalion plus Battery "D" 503d FA Battalion continued to pound at their assembly areas and supply lines, utilizing what men could be spared to further fortify their positions and prepare for expected attacks. During the day the tactical air also pounded the enemy and supplies were dropped by air including 105mm and 155mm ammunition. Some wounded were evacuated on the 14th of February by helicopter. Enemy action during the daylight hours of 14 Feb 1951, was fairly light and consisted mainly of probing attacks and patrol actions all of which were repulsed with the assistance of artillery. The 37th FA Battalion fired 69 missions, 33 of these were on enemy troop concentrations and expended a total of 1293 rounds with estimated enemy casualties of 935. Battery "B", 503d FA Battalion expended approximately 250 rounds reinforcing the fires of the 37th FA Battalion with estimated casualties of approximately 400.

At approximately 2200 hours on 14 Feb 1951, enemy mortars and artillery began to fall in the perimeter area and the battery positions. At 2330 hours the Chinese Communist Forces' artillery and mortars started a preparation which lasted for about 30 minutes, which was followed by the heaviest attack yet launched on the perimeter. The area occupied by Battery "B", 503d FA Battalion was directly in the path of advance of the main effort. Heavy mortar concentrations preceded the Chinese Communist Forces advance. The artillery batteries continued to fire in spite of the continued mortar, small arms and automatic weapons fire falling in their positions. The attack continued through the night. The Chinese Communist Forces succeeded in breaking through the outer perimeter in the sector between the 2d Battalion, 23d Infantry and the French Battalion, gaining the high ground immediately in rear of Battery "B", 503d FA Battalion's position and from this point making the position untenable. All available men in the artillery joined with the infantry in defense of the perimeter. The Chinese repeatedly broke through the lines of defense only to be destroyed by the tenacity of United States and French troops refusing to yield further ground to the numerically superior enemy.

Daylight of 15 Feb 1951, found the defenders of the perimeter counter attacking a fanatical and determined enemy. The 37th FA Battalion continued to pound the enemy at close range in support of a determined United States and French force to regain their positions and secure the battery position of Battery "B", 503d FA Battalion. Tactical air and artillery continued to support the attack which reached its height at approximately 1700 hours, 15 Feb 1951, at which time an armored column succeeded in reaching the perimeter by breaking the roadblock and advancing on the West road. During this period the 37th FA Battalion fired 54 missions expending 830 rounds of ammunition and inflicting approximately 850 casualties on the enemy. There was less than 400 rounds of 105mm ammunition left in the battalion at this time.

The determined and "last man" stand made by the defenders of the perimeter enabled Battery "B", 503d Field Artillery Battalion to recover all of their equipment intact and caused the enemy that were left, to

withdraw. By 2000 hours, 15 February 1951, the three divisions of Chinese Communist Force troops with the mission of annihilating the defenders of Chipvong-Ni, had failed.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

1 Incl
Sketch Chipvong-Ni, Korea

/s/ W. S. HURLEY

/t/ W. S. HURLEY

Capt Arty

Adjutant

ANNEX III

COMMUNICATIONS IN THE
23D REGIMENTAL AREA
CHI YONG-RI
DURING THE PERIOD
13-15 Feb 1951

In comparing perimeter wire communications with communications in a normal operation, damage from enemy mortar and artillery fire was greater in the perimeter. However, this was compensated by noticeable lessening of damage due to friendly tanks, bulldozers, vehicles, ect. The standard wire network was not satisfactory for adequate communication, therefore it had to be augmented by having a minimum of 3 lines to each tactical unit, each traversing a different route.

There were no problems with reference to radio communication within the RCT, due to the size and compactness of the perimeter. Radio communication to higher headquarters was satisfactory, with the exception that the constant load placed on the equipment made it necessary to perform higher echelon repairs for which the unit was not equipped. The equipment was in an unreliable condition because it had been in hard use for a long period of time. The main channel of communication was the VHF radio-telephone, which worked efficiently for the entire period. The only problem with it being the resupply of gasoline for its generator motor.

ANNEX IV

THE ROLE OF THE HEAVY MORTAR COMPANY IN THE
23d RCT DEFENSE PERIMETER AT
CHIPYONG-NI
DURING THE PERIOD
13 - 15 Feb 1951

On arriving at CHIPYONG-NI, the Company Commander of the Heavy Mortar Company, 23d RCT, placed his guns to support the perimeter as follows: The first platoon of the Heavy Mortar Company was to fire in general support of, and provide defensive fires for, the 1st Battalion. The third Heavy Mortar Platoon was to fire in support of the 3d Battalion, while the second Heavy Mortar Platoon was to fire one section in support of the French Battalion on the West of the perimeter and the other section in support of the 2d Battalion on the South sector.

With such a disposition of his supporting fire power, the Company Commander could cover the entire perimeter with supporting fire, if needed. With such a variety of directions of fire, the Company Commander had to insure maximum coordination and control of his mortars through the Fire Direction Center, and also maintain constant communication with the units stationed around the perimeter. To do this, a network of 110 wire was laid to all sectors of the perimeter as well as to the Regimental Headquarters. Furthermore in case the wire were to go out, operators were kept standing by with SCR-300 radios.

The Fire Direction Center and the Communications Center were dug in, with logs and sand bags overhead. Such precaution against enemy mortar and artillery fire were vital to guarantee that the Heavy Mortar Company could function whenever called for. One comment from the Fire Direction Center was that the shortage of M-10 plotting boards made it extremely difficult to keep six or eight fire missions going simultaneously.

The Heavy Mortar Company had moved into the CHIPYONG-NI perimeter with more than the basic load of ammunition. However, on the first night the perimeter was attacked, 1000 rounds were used. Furthermore, in the air drops received on the following day, there was no 4.2 Heavy Mortar ammunition. Thus only 500 rounds were fired the second night, even though there were calls for many more fire missions on targets which perhaps were not as vital at the time. On the third day of the Perimeter Defense, ammunition was expended only on regimental order, consequently many good targets of opportunity had to be passed-by. The 4.2 Heavy Mortar proved again that it is extremely effective and necessary for close-in support of the Infantry Units. Due to the size of the perimeter and the type of terrain, the 105-mm and 155-mm Howitzers proved excellent for long range firing, but the 4.2 mortar was the only heavy weapon that could give maximum close support.

The main and only difficulty encountered by the Heavy Mortar Company was the re-supply of ammunition. In a perimeter, when the RCT was surrounded by the enemy, the only means of re-supply was by air drop, and for some unknown reason, 4.2 ammunition was not included in the pre-packed combat loads, which were dropped from the planes.

ANNEX V

Hq 23d Regt, 2d Int Div
Korea
15 March 1951

INTELLIGENCE ANNEX TO ACCOMPANY AFTER ACTION REPORT

Period Covered: 29 January 1951 to 15 February 1951

1. UNIT IDENTIFICATION

a. 117th, 119th, 120th, 125th, 126th and 127th Chinese Divisions

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. Summary: On 29 January a patrol from the 1st Battalion became engaged in a firefight with enemy forces in the area known as the "Twin Tunnels". Enemy attacked from three sides and from high ground to their immediate rear. Enemy continued attacks throughout the night and were dispersed the following morning after a rescue force from the 2d Battalion smashed its way through to the beleaguered patrol. Approximately 100 enemy took part in the attack on this patrol.

Intelligence reports of the 29th indicated that in the grid squares 84 to 89 and 20 North to 24, enemy activity had tripled.

The 23d Regiment moved to the vicinity of "Twin Tunnels" on 30 January and set up a perimeter. A civilian in the area reported the enemy moving in numbers up to 500, South from Chechon-Ni. Enemy had also been sending patrols to the outlying towns in the area.

At about 0450 hours of the 31st, the enemy attacked in unknown strength the positions of Love and King Companies. The attacking forces were dressed in US uniforms and used "Bugles" for signals. Identification of the unit was unknown at this time. The French Battalion came under attack at 1000 hours. Russian and American type weapons were used by the attacking forces. Three notes on a bugle was the signal for the enemy attack. Positive identification of the unit was not made. The French did report that some of the attacking forces were speaking Chinese. From papers gathered and from the bugles, it was assumed that the unit was made up of both Chinese and North Korean Forces. The estimated strength of the enemy was believed to be two regiments. The attack continued throughout the day but no positive identification was made of the enemy unit. At 2400 hours the French sent a captured PW to Regiment.

Upon interrogation, the prisoner identified himself as a member of the Chinese Communist 125th Division, 33d Regiment. He stated that there were no North Koreans in his unit. The division included three regiments of about 1000 men each. He also stated that there were no big guns with the unit and that they had been in that area for the past 20 days.

On 2 February after failing to dislodge our forces by furious attacks with small arms, automatic weapons and mortars, the enemy withdrew north through CHIPYONG-NI.

On 3 February the 23d Regiment occupied CHIPYONG-NI and immediately set up a defense perimeter around the town. Aggressive patrol actions were immediately initiated to contact the enemy. Patrol activities began on the morning of 4 February. The 1st Battalion reported that the enemy was occupying positions on the West slope of HILL 345. King Company came under fire on HILL 506 and withdrew and artillery and mortar fire were called on the hill. The French Battalion brought in a prisoner who had surrendered. He identified his unit as the 125th Chinese Communist Division and that the Division was moving to the west of CHIPYONG. Small groups of enemy were observed by various patrols throughout the area. U.S. Safe Conduct Passes were found scattered over the hills in the regimental sector.

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From 4 February to 12 February enemy was contacted daily. On 6 February a 3d Bn patrol reached the summit of HILL 506 but were brought under mortar fire and the patrol withdrew. The French Bn reported that HILL 583 was occupied by enemy forces. Some enemy patrols of 4 to 5 men were intercepted by our patrols and dispersed.

On 10 February information was received that one (1) Bn of CCF was observed one kilometer North of SINCHON. This force had pack animals and pack howitzers. 5000 to 8000 CCFs were observed SE and E on a trail North of SONCHON. Reports of enemy build-ups came from other sectors as well. The 11th, 12th and 13th also brought continued reports of more enemy troops in the area. A Chinese prisoner of war stated that the 116th Div of the 39th Army was in front of us. A 1st Bn patrol reported unknown number of enemy southeast of their position. At 2100 hours 13 Feb, a report was received that through interrogation of refugees approximately 4000 Chinese were in the vicinity of YANG-DONG.

At 2207 hours of the 13th, Company "C" received automatic weapons fire and four rounds of mortar fire. This was to be the beginning of the CHIPYONG siege. Earlier in the evening the enemy was heard crawling along the ground at the northernmost sector of the perimeter. A line of torches was also observed and reported. They were about 60 in number and appeared to be about 4 kilometers away but approaching toward the position. The torches approached to about 1 kilometer and stopped still apparently in line.

The Regimental CP and other units within the perimeter were brought under enemy artillery and mortar fire at approximately 2230 hours which increased in density throughout the night. At 0100 hours at the juncture of the 1st Bn and the French Bn in the perimeter, the enemy launched a company size attack. This attack came without warning and was opened by a barrage of hand grenades, followed by an intense volley of small arms and automatic weapons fire. This attack failed. About an hour later the enemy again attacked but this time in the center of the French Bn's position. The enemy continued probing attacks throughout the rest of the night and all around the perimeter. The enemy attacked "G" Company's position at 0340 hours and broke through but were later contained. Company "C" of the 1st Bn came under attack twice during the night and beat off the vigorous assaults. The first attack was at 0328 and the second at 0433. All four Battalions were hit by the enemy during the night by company size attacks. Torches were seen several times during the night and a Chinese Bugler was heard in all sectors. At 0535 the MSR was cut and the enemy had the regiment cut off.

At 0845 on the morning of the 14th an officer of the Chinese Communist Forces surrendered to the French Battalion. French also captured 14 other Chinese soldiers and sent them to Regiment. The enemy unit was identified as the 359th Regiment of the 100th CCF Division. During the morning the 3d Bn also brought in prisoners.

During the day the perimeter was subjected to intermittent mortar and artillery fire and many enemy observed digging in on surrounding high ground by air and by our CP's. PW reports that 20,000 enemy were on HILL 506 and would attack the Regimental perimeter that night (14 Feb). PWs also stated that between 7,000 and 8,000 enemy troops were on high hill to the North and that they had no casualties from air strikes.

At 2025 hours of the 14th the enemy again began his probing attacks against the perimeter. Company "K" was the first unit to come under attack by a company size force. At about this same time mortar and artillery fire were received in the 2d Bn sector. The 1st Bn reported that the enemy was digging in, in front of Company "C"'s position. The interior of the perimeter was again subjected to mortar and artillery fire but not as extensive as the preceding night. All attacks were repulsed. There was a slight penetration of "G" Company's lines. "K" Company reported enemy in their foxholes but situation under control. "C" Company was hit by an estimated two (2) companies but had no trouble repelling them.

During the morning and afternoon of 15 February Baker Company counter-attacked positions taken from George Company by the enemy. At 1840 hours with the aid of Air Strikes and an armored column from the 5th Cav, the Hill was secured and the enemy destroyed. Air reported that the enemy was fleeing in all directions. Enemy did not attack in force during the night although a few rounds of mortar were reported.

On 16 February during the morning hours AOP reported 1000 enemy moving North of "Twin Tunnels" area. Patrols were dispatched by all units to positions one mile from their base if possible. Little enemy contact was made throughout the day.

During the process of interrogation of Prisoners of War by the 23d Inf IPW Team, the following Chinese units were identified in the CHIPYONG-NI battle: 117th, 119th, 126th, 125th and 127th Divisions.

b. Operations of Enemy Component Elements. The enemy used artillery and mortar fire extensively during the course of operations at CHIPYONG. Self-Propelled artillery was reported as being used. Their Artillery and mortar fire were fairly accurate and areas in which it was used were well covered.

From previous reports and patrol actions it is almost a certainty that the enemy forces marched long distances to assembly areas near the U.N. lines where they were informed what was to be expected of them and their mission. In one case an enemy battalion marched in single file from their bivouac area to the assembly area outside of the Regimental perimeter, a distance of about 12 kilometers. They departed at 1900 hours and arrived at the assembly area at 2400 hours. This could account for most attacks taking place after midnight. At the assembly point the unit commanders were given their instructions and ammunition was passed out to the men. White strips of cloth were tied on to the left arms of the troops for identification purposes. Signals were also announced. In this case, one clap of the hands to halt, two claps to advance, and three claps for withdrawal. Talking and smoking were prohibited.

The enemy attacks were generally made by company size units followed by successive attacks in the same or nearby places. Approach routes are usually narrow trails rather than marked roads. Each Battalion Commander seems to conduct his operation as he pleases.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Estimated Enemy Losses (prisoners and casualties)

Twin Tunnels - Casualties 2855; PWs 4.

Chinyong-Ni - Casualties 4946; PWs 79.

b. Enemy Combat Efficiency. Initially 95%, at end of period it had deteriorated to at least 45%

c. Morale. Initially high. At the end of period it was low due to heavy casualties suffered and failure to succeed in assigned mission.

ANNEX VI

LOGISTICS IN THE
23D RCT PERIMETER DEFENSE
DURING THE P.E. JOD
13 - 15 Feb 1951

SUBJECT: Statement by Capt Greene, 23d RCT S-4 Concerning Logistical Problems in the perimeter defense at CHILPYONG-NI

Normal logistical supply was impossible due to the fact that the enemy had bisected the main Supply Route from the Service Trains. The only method of supply available was by means of air drops from the Cargo Command located in Japan. Coordination of all types of supply was initiated from Regimental Level and channeled through Division, Corps, and Army to the Japan Logistical Command. The major items of supply which were critical in a perimeter defense were Classes I and III (food and ammunition) signal, and medical supplies. It was determined that immediate emergency resupply by means of the pre-packed cargo drops did not satisfy the critical requirements of the RCT, although the time factor precluded the packing of specified amounts and classes of supply. At least twelve hours preparation was the minimum time required for delivery of specified drops, due to the geographical location of the supply point in Japan and the time spent assembling and preparing the cargo load.

Difficulties in communication with the incoming Cargo Planes were encountered by the T'CP, within the perimeter, because of insufficient information concerning radio sending and receiving channels. This situation necessitated that "mosquito" or artillery liaison planes be used as guides to the drop zone. Difficulties in hitting the drop zone were experienced by lack of communication (as previously mentioned) and strong prevailing winds which caused considerable drift. Therefore it was necessary to organize recovery teams in sufficient numbers to retrieve the widely scattered cargo drops, and bring them to a central distributing point.

Communications were a necessity for a successful night drop. The drop zone had to be clearly defined by means of vehicle headlights representing the extremities of the drop zone. This practice was extremely hazardous as it presented a defined target for enemy artillery and mortar fire.

Lessons learned during the period 13 - 15 February, which included both day and night drops, show that close liaison between T'CP and cargo ships is a necessity for successful approach to, and control of drops within the zone. All supply personnel should be familiar with recovery and classification procedure. Definite control measures should be established to insure the delivery of all the dropped material, to a central distributing point. Promiscuous looting, especially at night, of certain types of supply by personnel not engaged in recovery, was experienced, which resulted in an unequal distribution of a specified class of supply. As close a surveillance as possible must be kept over the drop area.

ANNEX VII
 ROLE OF THE REGIMENTAL CLEARING STATION
 AND BATTALION AID STATIONS
 IN THE
 PERIMETER DEFENSE OF CHIPYONG-NI
 13 - 15 Feb 1951

The defense of CHIPYONG-NI from 13 - 15 Feb 1951 demonstrated the inherent ability of an ROT to care for its own wounded while isolated from divisional medical support when afforded air supply and air evacuation for its critically wounded.

The four battalion aid stations and the aid station of the 37th FA Battalion were spaced rather evenly around the rear-center of the perimeter, with very little defilade. The collecting station was placed from vicinity near the center of the perimeter and was entirely unprotected by defilade.

During the week prior to the Chinese attack evacuation had been by box ambulances to the 2d Clearing Platoon of the 2d Clearing Company, at INO-RI, 20 miles to the South. Evacuation took place during daylight hours, save for two times when critically wounded casualties were evacuated at night. The ambulances were escorted by armed patrols at these times. Casualties were relatively light during this period and resulted chiefly from patrol activities that were probing the enemy's buildup.

As the extent of the Communist build-up became apparent the walls of the two squad tents utilized by the collecting station were barricaded by railroad ties laid upon each other to the height of the walls.

Soon after the beginning of the Communist attack at 2200 hours, 13 Feb, mortar and artillery fire were brought to bear upon the center of the perimeter. Here, within a radius of approximately two hundred yards, were situated the Regimental CP, the Tank Co, the heavy mortars, the anti-aircraft twin 40's and quad fifties - and the collecting station. During the next 72 hours the collecting station functioned as an aid station for those wounded in the immediate area as well as a collecting station for the wounded from each of the five aid stations.

There were approximately 100 patients within the collecting station at daybreak on the 14th. Helicopters were requested but were unable to land because of the small arms, mortar and artillery fire placed upon the area. As casualties arrived more tents were procured until six had been erected. The walls of each were barricaded with railroad ties and rice bags. The frozen ground prevented their being dug in and there was no way to protect the tops of the tents from direct hits.

During the night of the 14th, the perimeter defenses were subjected to even stronger attack and the center of the perimeter was subjected to even more intense mortar and artillery fire. All six tents were soon filled with approximately 200 casualties, so that each of the aid stations was instructed to keep as many casualties, as could be kept warm and to evacuate only the most severely wounded to the collecting station. During the night the tents were riddled by shell fragments but only one patient was re-wounded while in the collecting station.

Intermittent small arms, mortar and artillery fire was placed on the perimeter during the 15th but it was still possible to evacuate 20 patients by helicopter.

The supply and nursing problems had gradually increased in importance during this time. Plankets, dressings and whole blood were brought in by the helicopters and litters and blankets were air-dropped in sufficient quantities.

Patients were being fed two meals a day by this time. Those unable to eat were given intravenous glucose in saline and were evacuated by helicopter as soon as possible. Nursing care and catheterization of those unable to void was adequately handled by the station personnel.

Since some of the patients had been wounded as much as 24-36 hours previously, it was necessary to redress wounds, change splints and to begin penicillin therapy. Tetanus toxoid was not available, however.

By the night of the 15th there were approximately 300 patients being cared for by collecting station personnel, including the casualties suffered by the tank force that had fought its way into the perimeter.

There was no attack on the night of the 15th and helicopters appeared with first light of the 16th. Snow and fog soon made further helicopter evacuation impossible until the afternoon.

The task force of the 5th Cavalry Regiment which had returned to its own lines at noon of the 16th without enemy contact, returned in the late afternoon with two ambulance platoons. Twenty-eight ambulances and six two and one half ton trucks were then loaded with the 250 casualties that remained (some 50 had been evacuated by helicopter), and were escorted to the clearing station by the tanks of the cavalry.

CHIPYONG thus demonstrated the self-sufficiency of the RCT, from the medical stand-point for short periods of time, when augmented by air resupply and air evacuation of the most seriously wounded. The fact that only two patients did die after their reception at the collecting station during this three day period illustrates very graphically this point.

Aid stations must function also as collecting and holding stations, and the collecting station must, of necessity, function as an aid station. Personnel and vehicles must therefore be allocated accordingly.

Whole blood will be required since the enemy and/or the weather will preclude the air evacuation of some of the most seriously wounded. Tetanus toxoid, for the casualties that remain, should be requisitioned and this, along with as much definitive treatment and nursing care as can be provided will be necessary.

ANNEX VIII

AIR ACTION IN SUPPORT OF THE
23D RCT DEFENSE PERIMETER
AT CHIPYONG-NI
DURING THE PERIOD
1 - 16 Feb 1951

From the 1st to the 12th of February, B-26 and fighter strikes were called upon enemy troop concentrations around the perimeter and strategic targets north of CHIPYONG-NI.

On February 13 at 0900 the "mosquito" assigned to the 23d RCT observed 1,000 enemy located in the vicinity of DS910420 and CS918480, moving south. Eight flights of Navy F4U's and Air Force F-80 jets, rocketed, strafed and dropped napalm on these enemy troops. The air OP reported groups of from 15-20 dead all along the target area and by 1700 the enemy were dispersed.

At dark, the TACP requested and received a "Firefly" and he directed this flare ship all through the night, lighting up the area to the front of the perimeter and any special locations called for by unit commanders. Thus the enemy was greatly hindered in his attempts to attack the perimeter.

From 0300-0500 on 14 February, 3 flights of B-26's hit strategic targets to the north of the perimeter in support of the RCT. At 0645 hours, the RCT was notified that an air drop which had been requested, would arrive at 1000 hours. Panels were displayed and since fighters were scheduled to be in the area at the same time, S-3 air split the team into two (2) sections, each with a radio jeep. One section was to handle the fighter support and the other to direct the C119 cargo planes into the drop zone. Due to the foggy weather, it was very difficult for the C119's to locate the perimeter area. Therefore, Lt. Morgan, Air Force Officer with the TACP, set up a commercial-type radio beam on the broadcast channel of the air radio. This beam, a field expedient, served excellently as a means of guiding the cargo planes directly to the drop zone, within the perimeter. In spite of poor visibility and strong winds almost 95% of the drops were made in the drop zone.

The fighters were also delayed, due to the poor flying weather, but were able to take off at 1050. The first three flights of fighter planes arrived at 1430, and the first air drop was at 1515. After the 2nd air drop, the enemy at the extreme south end of the drop zone began to shoot at the cargo planes with small arms and machinegun fire. By 1720, 17 cargo planes had completed their mission with 7 more planes on the way. The last air drop of the day was completed at 1845.

On 15 February, one B-26 air strike was directed against enemy supply bases and division assembly areas, during the early morning hours, in support of the 23d RCT. At 0755, the weather air-drop plane arrived and received instructions from the TACP as to the drop zone location, the drop signals, and the direction of approach.

From 0830 to 1030, thirty (30) C-119s came in with their cargo. During these air drops the ground controller and the retrieving crews were under constant mortar and small arms fire. At 0840 the TACP was directed to use 1 flight of fighters for air cover for the air drop. These flights of covering planes were rotated by the TACP so that their bomb and rocket loads were not lost for the ground support. While the air drops were being made, there were as many as four (4) different fighter strikes being directed by the TACP at the same time. From 1030 to 1900 hours air strikes were placed on HILL 197 in preparation for the "B" Company attack to retake "B" Company's former positions. Strikes were made on enemy positions on HILLS 397, 306, 506 and 442. An air strike

was made against mortar positions on the reverse slopes of HILL 248. At 1450 and 1515 hours, air strikes were made which routed the enemy from the former "G" Company positions and enabled "B" Company to take the objective.

At times during these strikes napalm was dropped as close as 75 yards in front of the friendly troops. The enemy was so concentrated on these positions that one napalm bomb killed 60 (counted) enemy in one position. Such close support was only possible through direct communication with the platoon leaders by phone and direct observation of the target area by the TACP. The Air Report for the day showed that 131 sorties had been flown in support of the 23d RCT.

Night Air Drops began at 2130. Each plane had to be "talked" into its final approach by the ground controller and given a signal from the ground as to when to drop its cargo. To outline the drop zone, vehicles were placed with headlights shining into the zone at points on the flanks of the drop zone. This outlined the area where the cargo had to be dropped to land in the zone. Thus once the pilot was oriented, his cargo would be dropped when he was directly over one of the jeeps placed on the flank. Throughout the entire drop, the vehicle headlights attracted enemy mortar and small arms fire to the drop zone. Thus it was extremely hazardous for both the ground controller and retrieving parties to function.

All during the air drop, the other TACP section directed the "Fire-fly" over enemy positions, while being subjected to heavy enemy mortar fire.

On 16 February, at 0500 hours one C-119 came in with emergency supplies and made a successful drop. At 1315 the helicopters began to arrive to pick up wounded in spite of the very foggy weather and the intense enemy small arms fire.

The conclusions drawn from the Air Support of the 23d RCT Perimeter are that first, it is believed a record was set as to the number of fighter sorties (131) delivered for ground support to any one unit in a single day. Many of these fighters were directed to the targets in spite of bad weather. It was fortunate that the cargo planes could be directed to the drop zone by make shift means, in spite of the unfavorable weather conditions. It is recommended that a Standard Operating Procedure be established for Ground-Air coordination of emergency air drops under unfavorable weather conditions. Also if additional air cover is needed, that it should not be taken from the fighter planes already assigned to ground support.

ANNEX IX

THE ROLE OF THE 23d TANK COMPANY IN THE
23d RCT DEFENSE PERIMETER
AT CHIPYONG-NI
DURING THE PERIOD
13 - 15 Feb 1951

In the Regimental Combat Team perimeter on 13-15 February 1951, the tanks were employed in the following manner.

During the hours of darkness, tanks were placed in strategic blocking positions and road blocks outside the perimeter. At the first light of dawn the tanks returned to positions within the perimeter from which they could be employed to fire and could go as "spearhead" out with the infantry patrols. At times, they were also used in tank-infantry assaults to recover or gain strategic positions for the perimeter.

The main obstacle encountered by the tanks was the terrain. In the snow and ice-covered mountains, maneuverability was restricted to the roads, in most cases. The rice paddies were not useful because of their extremely high banks, and the fact that when a tank would sink through the frost line of the earth, it would become bogged down. Even along the roads, the enemy had placed men armed with captured Bazookas, both the 2.36 and 3.5, which unless knocked out by the riflemen, greatly hindered the movement of tanks.

At CHIPYONG-NI it was found that generally communication with the infantry and other units worked satisfactorily in a perimeter. About the only difficulty encountered was that of communication between tanks within the platoon, where the radio sets failed to function, either through damage incurred by enemy fire or jarring as the tanks maneuvered over the rugged terrain. The phone at the rear of each tank was available for communication between tank and infantry. However, at times the phone could not be used because the tanks would draw mortar and small arms fire, and the foot-soldier was pinned down and couldn't reach the phone. Perhaps a lower location of the phone on the rear of the tank would be the solution.


The supply of ammunition, gasoline, and food by air drop worked very satisfactorily for the tanks at CHIPYONG-NI. The Tank Company had started out with a complete combat load at the "Twin Tunnels" battle. An air drop received at the "Twin Tunnels" actually resulted in a slight surplus on hand during the move to CHIPYONG-NI.

Because the supply train moved right along with the tank company to positions within the perimeter, the supply and resupply of ammunition and gasoline was most efficient. Furthermore, the tank ammunition and gasoline which was received in the Regimental Combat Load air drop at CHIPYONG-NI proved adequate for all needs, both offensive and defensive.

CASUALTY REPORT OF
THE 23d INFANTRY REGIMENT
FOR THE BATTLE OF CHIRYONG-NI
FOR PERIOD 3 - 16 FEB 1951

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>KIA</u> | <u>MIA</u> | <u>MIA</u> | <u>TOTAL NON-BATTLE</u> | |
|----------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------------------|-----------|
| 1st Bn 23d Inf | 14 | 70 | 2 | 86 | 25 |
| 2d Bn 23d Inf | 0 | 92 | 37 | 128 | 8 |
| 3d Bn 23d Inf | 18 | 35 | 3 | 56 | 2 |
| Special Units | 2 | 25 | - | 27 | 7 |
| TOTAL 23d Inf | <u>43</u> | <u>212</u> | <u>42</u> | <u>297</u> | <u>42</u> |
| French Bn | 9 | 47 | - | 56 | 9 |
| TOTAL | <u>52</u> | <u>259</u> | <u>42</u> | <u>353</u> | <u>51</u> |

GRAND TOTAL: Battle and Non-Battle Casualties: 404



LEGEND

- Gun positions
- Direction of fire
- (M) Mortar Concentrations
- [M] Mortar Harassing Fire
- (A) Artillery Concentrations; due to scale of sketch, all concentrations not shown